{"id":1906,"date":"2026-03-01T14:21:20","date_gmt":"2026-03-01T12:21:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/when-production-costs-next-to-nothing-but-nobody-has-any-money-why-europe-needs-the-digital-euro\/"},"modified":"2026-03-01T14:21:20","modified_gmt":"2026-03-01T12:21:20","slug":"when-production-costs-next-to-nothing-but-nobody-has-any-money-why-europe-needs-the-digital-euro","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/en\/when-production-costs-next-to-nothing-but-nobody-has-any-money-why-europe-needs-the-digital-euro\/","title":{"rendered":"When production costs next to nothing but nobody has any money: why Europe needs the digital euro"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Artificial intelligence is about to do something that no central bank has been able to solve: produce so much and so cheaply that money stops working as we know it. And Europe, true to its tradition, debates while others act. This is why the digital euro is not a technological whim, but a structural necessity.  <\/p>\n<h2>The problem: when producing more cheaply breaks the economy<\/h2>\n<p>In a <a href=\"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/en\/technological-deflation-and-productivity-when-ai-no-longer-allows-you-to-ignore-the-elephant-in-the-room\/\">recent article<\/a> I explained how AI is taking to the extreme a trend that we have been observing for years: <strong>technological deflation<\/strong>. The marginal cost of producing goods and services tends to zero. Training an artificial intelligence model is expensive, but once trained, generating an additional report, a translation, a diagnosis or a line of code costs practically nothing.  <\/p>\n<p>In theory, this is fantastic. In practice, it has a consequence that few want to look at head-on: if production becomes cheaper and cheaper, prices tend to fall. If prices go down, companies bill less. If they invoice less, they pay less wages. If wages go down, people consume less. And if people consume less, prices go down even more. It is a spiral that economists know well and that has an unglamorous name: deflationary trap.      <\/p>\n<p>Fast paced along the path of the <a href=\"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/en\/the-matrix-effect-or-how-digitalization-shrinks-our-economy\/\">Matrix effect<\/a>: We replace expensive processes with cheap digital solutions that bring a lot of use-value but little money into economic circulation. Welfare can rise while GDP stagnates or, worse, contracts. <\/p>\n<h2>Quantitative easing: a hammer where a scalpel is needed<\/h2>\n<p>What do central banks do when the economy cools? Historically, they lower interest rates to make borrowing cheaper and thus stimulate consumption and investment. But what happens when rates are already at zero and <a href=\"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/en\/quantitative-easing-and-helicopter-money-what-are-they-and-what-are-they-for\/\">no one wants to borrow<\/a> because the future of employment is increasingly uncertain? That lever stops working.   <\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/en\/quantitative-easing-and-helicopter-money-what-are-they-and-what-are-they-for\/\">Quantitative easing (QE)<\/a> then comes into play: the central bank creates money to buy debt from banks and large funds. The idea is that this liquidity ends up reaching companies and households in the form of credit. The problem, as we have seen in Europe, the US and Japan over the last decade, is that much of this money never reaches the real economy. It gets trapped in the financial circuit: stock market, bonds, real estate. The ECB injected more than 2.5 trillion euros and barely managed to bring inflation closer to its 2% target.    <\/p>\n<p>The result is a dual economy: skyrocketing financial asset prices (enriching those who already have wealth) and an anemic everyday economy (where wages are barely rising and credit is not flowing). If anyone wonders <a href=\"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/en\/why-economic-and-social-inequality\/\">why there is so much inequality<\/a>, an important part of the answer is here. <\/p>\n<p>Quantitative expansion is a hammer. And when your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. The problem is that technological deflation is not a nail: it is a structural change that requires surgical precision.  <\/p>\n<h2>CBDCs: from hammer to scalpel<\/h2>\n<p>This is where central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) come in. The idea is conceptually simple but revolutionary in its implications: that the <a href=\"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/en\/central-banks-when-how-and-for-what-they-create-money\/\">central bank<\/a> can issue digital money directly to citizens and businesses, without going through the commercial banking system as an intermediary. <\/p>\n<p>Today, when the ECB wants to stimulate the economy, money follows a circuitous route: the ECB buys bonds from commercial banks, the banks have more liquidity, and <em>in theory<\/em> they lend more to businesses and households. In practice, as we have seen, banks often invest that liquidity in financial markets instead of lending it out. It is like trying to water a garden through a middleman who keeps half the water.  <\/p>\n<p>A CBDC opens a direct channel. And that allows something that was technically impossible until now: precision monetary policy. Let&#8217;s look at five reasons why Europe needs to take this step.  <\/p>\n<h2>5 reasons why Europe needs the digital euro (and why it&#8217;s already too late)<\/h2>\n<h3>Reason 1: Quantitative easing reaching the street<\/h3>\n<p>With a digital euro, the ECB could deposit money directly into citizens&#8217; digital wallets. Not buying bonds from Goldman Sachs waiting for something to trickle down, but direct transfers to those who actually consume and produce. It is what Milton Friedman imagined with <a href=\"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/en\/quantitative-easing-and-helicopter-money-what-are-they-and-what-are-they-for\/\">helicopter money<\/a>, but with an infrastructure that makes it viable, controllable and reversible.  <\/p>\n<p>In a scenario of technological deflation, where the problem is not the scarcity of goods but the scarcity of circulating money, this tool is essential. It is not a matter of distributing money out of generosity, but because the economic physics of an ultra-efficient system no longer rests solely on the ground of traditional employment and credit. <\/p>\n<h3>Reason 2: Programmable money<\/h3>\n<p>A digital euro could incorporate rules. Money that expires if not spent within a certain period, stimulating consumption in times of crisis. Money that can only be used in certain sectors: energy transition, local economy, professional training. Differentiated interest rates according to economic context.   <\/p>\n<p>This is not science fiction. It is the leap from monetary policy as a generic instrument to monetary policy as a precision tool. From adjusting the temperature of the whole house with a single thermostat, to having room-by-room control. Interesting, but for the moment Europe is not even considering it.   <\/p>\n<h3>Reason 3: Credit disintermediation<\/h3>\n<p>In modern economies, <a href=\"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/en\/how-money-is-created-commercial-banks\/\">most money is created by commercial banks<\/a> when they extend credit. If AI weakens the foundation on which that credit is built (stable wages, predictable future income expectations), the traditional money creation mechanism begins to fail. Less new credit, less new money. Old credit is paid back, destroying money. The system runs out of fuel.    <\/p>\n<p>A digital euro offers an alternative way to inject money into the economy that does not depend on someone wanting to borrow. It does not replace bank credit, but complements it in scenarios where the latter loses traction. <\/p>\n<h3>Reason 4: Competitiveness in cross-border payments<\/h3>\n<p>The current international payment system, based on SWIFT and bank correspondence, is slow, expensive and deeply dependent on the dollar. An international transfer can take days and cost significant fees. In a world where commerce is digitizing at breakneck speed, this is an anachronism.  <\/p>\n<p>A digital euro with cross-border payment infrastructure could settle transactions in seconds, drastically reduce fees and offer Europe strategic autonomy from the dollar&#8217;s dominance in the global financial system. It&#8217;s not just efficiency: it&#8217;s sovereignty. <\/p>\n<h3>Reason 5: Because China is already doing it (and is a decade ahead of us).<\/h3>\n<p>And here we come to the most uncomfortable argument. While Europe debates, China executes. The digital yuan (e-CNY) has been in pilot since 2019 and by the end of 2025 had processed more than 3.4 billion transactions with a cumulative value of $2.3 trillion, a growth of 800% in two years. It spans 17 provinces with more than 225 million active digital wallets.   <\/p>\n<p>Since January 2026, China has made a quantum leap: e-CNY has ceased to be mere &#8220;digital cash&#8221; and become &#8220;digital deposit money&#8221;. Commercial banks can now pay interest on balances in digital yuan, competing directly with traditional bank accounts and mobile payment giants WeChat Pay and Alipay. <\/p>\n<p>But more relevant is the geopolitical dimension. China has set up international digital yuan trading centers in Beijing and Shanghai. The mBridge project, developed jointly with Hong Kong, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates, has reached a volume of $55.49 billion, with e-CNY accounting for more than 95% of settlements. Cross-border payment pilots are already underway with Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and several Southeast Asian countries, where e-CNY transactions exceeded 500 billion yuan in the first three quarters of 2025 alone.   <\/p>\n<p>Chinese system processes transactions in seconds where SWIFT takes days. It reduces fees by up to 50%. And it offers something no Western alternative can: an integrated ecosystem from retail payment to international trade settlement.  <\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the digital euro is not expected before 2029 and, in its first phase, will not even include interest payments. The gap is already considerable and widening every quarter. <\/p>\n<h2>Risks to address (not avoid)<\/h2>\n<p>It would be disingenuous to present CBDCs as a risk-free panacea. There are risks, and they are serious. <\/p>\n<p>The first and most obvious is <strong>surveillance<\/strong>. A central bank with real-time visibility of every transaction has unprecedented power. China knows this and uses it, in a context where individual privacy is not exactly a political priority. For Europe, the red line should be clear: the digital euro needs robust privacy guarantees, comparable at least to those of cash for everyday transactions.   <\/p>\n<p>The second is <strong>bank disintermediation<\/strong>. If the ECB can reach the citizen directly, why do you need a commercial bank? The banks know this and are pushing for the digital euro to be as limited as possible. The ECB has already responded by proposing holding limits (probably \u20ac3,000 per person). It is an understandable compromise, but one that limits precisely the most transformative functionalities.    <\/p>\n<p>The third is <strong>programmable money as a control tool<\/strong>. What today is &#8220;money that expires to stimulate consumption&#8221; tomorrow could be &#8220;money that is useless to buy what the government considers inconvenient&#8221;. The tool is extremely powerful in both directions. Democratic safeguards and independent control mechanisms are not a detail: they are the design itself.   <\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion: to act or to be acted upon<\/h2>\n<p>Technological deflation is not a doomsday prediction. It is an observable trend that AI will accelerate to levels that we will no longer be able to <a href=\"https:\/\/unorthodox-economics.com\/en\/technological-deflation-and-productivity-when-ai-no-longer-allows-you-to-ignore-the-elephant-in-the-room\/\">ignore<\/a>. When production is almost free but no one has money to buy, the problem will not be one of production but of distribution. And the current monetary tools, designed for a world where human labor was the main engine of the economy, will begin to fail in ways we are already seeing but few dare to name.   <\/p>\n<p><strong>The digital euro is not the solution to all problems. But it is probably the most important infrastructure that Europe could build to face the next decade. <\/strong>  Not because of technological fashion, but because we need precision tools where today we only have hammers. Because the alternative to acting is not to maintain the status quo: it is to cede the financial architecture of the future to those who are acting. <\/p>\n<p>China has understood this and has invested a decade in implementation. Europe is still debating whether it should start. Perhaps it is time for the debate to become urgent.  <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Artificial intelligence is about to do something that no central bank has been able to solve: produce so much and so cheaply that money stops working as we know it. And Europe, true to its tradition, debates while others act. This is why the digital euro is not a technological whim, but a structural necessity. 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